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The crisis in legal education has been defined and accentuated by
urgent and existential critiques. This body of complaint and suggestion—in the
form of books, foundation reports, law review articles, major media entries,
and blog posts—has two gaping holes that this Essay seeks to fill. First, the
critiques fail to attend to the diminishing of social justice values and
commitments in legal education in the period leading up to the 2008 recession,
especially as clinical education—often designated as the carrier of justice
values in law schools—faced generational shifts and law schools extended
“practical” education to more students. Second, with the exception of the work
of Robin West, there is little in the way of a forward-looking, progressive, and
justice-oriented response to the crisis of legal education. The reform discourse
since the 2008 recession is composed almost exclusively of proposals, such as
those by William Henderson and Brian Tamanaha, undergirded by neoliberal
assumptions and constructs. Leading reformers accept the accelerated
disaggregation and commodification of legal practice without attention to
aspects of the profession that privilege the public good over market norms and
rationales. This Essay draws on clinical practice rooted in pedagogies focused
on the development of critical analysis and political engagement to make the
case for a progressive vision of law school reform—and, more generally, the
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This near-universal and indeed near-militant avoidance of the concept
of justice in the very educational institutions that should centralize its
study . . . is so indefensible (and so rarely defended) as to be fairly
labeled pathological.
––Robin L. West1
“Skills training,” clinical legal education, “experiential learning”—all
these are but the tips of an iceberg representing deeper disputes over
the aims of legal education, the roles of lawyers in a changing,
transnationalizing society and a destabilization of employment and
long-term security. The task of reforming legal education, thus
regarded, becomes an exercise in reflection upon the nature of legal
knowledge and the scope of ethical and political responsibility of
lawyers.
––Peer Zumbansen2

1. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM 27 (2014).
2. Peer Zumbansen, What Lies Before, Behind and Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on
Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal Education, in STATELESS LAW: EVOLVING
BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE 215, 221 (Helge Dedek & Shauna Van Praagh eds., 2015) (footnotes
omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
Calls for change in legal education have evolved in the last decade.
Earlier critiques, mainly focused on the disconnection between schooling and
practice, were tough and pointed but with limited effect. As the bottom has
fallen out of the markets for legal employment and law school admissions, the
criticism has become urgent and existential. This body of complaint and
suggestion—in the form of books, foundation reports, law review articles,
major media entries, and blog posts—has two gaping holes that this Essay
seeks to fill. First, the critiques fail to attend to the diminishing of social justice
values and commitments in legal education in the period leading up to the 2008
recession, especially as clinical education—often designated as the carrier of
justice values in law schools—faced generational shifts and law schools
extended “practical” education to more students. Second, with the exception of
the work of Robin West, there is little in the way of a forward-looking,
progressive, and justice-oriented response to the crisis of legal education. The
legal education reform discourse since the 2008 recession is composed almost
exclusively of proposals undergirded by neoliberal assumptions and
constructs.3 This Essay draws on clinical practice to make the case for law
school reforms that emphasize justice, connection, and the cogeneration by
lawyers and communities of approaches to entrenched social problems.
The focus of my initial thinking in this area responds to the
mainstreaming of experiential legal education around the publication of
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Practice of Law by the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 2007.4 The challenge has been
to defend the social justice imperative embedded in clinical legal education, as
deans and faculties have expanded practical skills training in response to the
“professionalism crisis.”5 The founders and initial funders of modern clinical
education possessed an underlying social and political vision alongside a skills
agenda,6 which created openings for clinicians and students to engage in
innovative and important social justice work at law schools across the country.
Generational shifts within U.S. clinical education7 create uncertainty about how
to nurture and preserve this underlying social and political vision.8 Leading
3.
4.

See infra Part I.C for a discussion of “neoliberal” precepts.
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
5. See WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7–10.
6. See Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327 (2001).
7. See Praveen Kosuri, Clinical Legal Education at a Generational Crossroads: X Marks the
Spot, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 205, 213–17 (2010).
8. “The struggle to preserve the social justice origins of legal clinics will be the defining
challenge of the twenty-first century for clinical legal education. Faced with pressures to assimilate to
the general curriculum, standardize programs, measure learning outcomes, cater to students’ shortterm career interests, and palliate government resistance both domestic and foreign, clinicians
increasingly will be forced to justify their existence in student-centered terms that can obscure the
mission of serving needy clients and communities.” Rachel Moran, Transformation and Training in
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figures in legal education have sought to flatten American Bar Association
(ABA) accreditation standards, alter assumptions regarding faculty
employment security, and accentuate skills training.9 In such an environment,
will relatively low-cost externships and apprenticeships replace clinics with a
social justice mission? Legal services and public defender offices will continue
to suffer in an era of government austerity.10 As public interest law shrinks,
how will clinics respond? Will clinics have the resources necessary to replace
the loss of funded legal representation for the poor? Will there be pressure to
forego broader social change advocacy in exchange for individual client
services?
As law schools seek to integrate experiential education across the
curriculum, it is essential to consider how the transfer of skills and doctrine
might take priority over, and thus diminish, the social justice imperative.11
These shifts suggest that those who wish to preserve clinical education as a
space for social justice work must excavate the pedagogical value underlying
such work. Law students will continue to represent individual poor clients.
Individual representation falls within the access to justice norms of the legal
profession and comports with the skills agenda advanced by the Carnegie
Foundation and other observers reacting in part to the downsizing of the legal
market.12 But the social change component of working with groups of poor
clients will be most vulnerable as we endure the resistances and pressures noted
above. This is the first gap in the discourse on U.S. legal education that I
address in this Essay.
While the disconnection with practice and the economic crisis in legal
education has received widespread attention, a longstanding existential crisis
(in Robin West’s terms)—the consistent sidelining of justice within law
schools and the lack of underlying theories of lawyering—is rarely discussed or

the Law: Serving Clinical Education’s Two Masters, AALS NEWS, May 2009, at 1, 18,
http://www.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/april2009newsletter.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NE65FDZZ].
9. See, e.g., David Yellen, Loosening the ABA’s Grip on Law Schools, FAC. LOUNGE (Feb.
21, 2013), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/02/loosening-the-abas-reins-on-law-schools.html
[http://perma.cc/48XV-JFRQ].
10. See generally, e.g., Tyler Kasperek Somes, The Legal Services NYC Strike: Neoliberalism,
Austerity and Resistance, 71 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 8 (2014).
11. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009)
(“Paradoxically, by carving pedagogies of practice out of positivist norms of neutrality and scientific
technique, and individualist norms of liberal legalism, law schools have fashioned a new formalism
severed from difference-based identity, context, and community. Pedagogies of practice common to
both clinics and skills courses point to the rise of this new formalism in claims of neutral lawyer
judgment, technical ‘lawyering’ process values, and client-centered representation indifferent to the
other-regarding interests of community building.”). However, it is important to understand that the
social justice imperative and skills transfer are not inherently oppositional. Focus on complex social
problems facilitates the transfer of high-level lawyering skills. See infra Part IV.C.
12. See, e.g., Mark Yates, The Carnegie Effect: Elevating Practical Training over Liberal
Education in Curricular Reform, 17 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 233, 245–48 (2011).
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confronted.13 This constitutes the second gap in the discourse since the advent
of the economic crisis in U.S. legal education. The most well-known reform
proposals, by legal scholars such as William Henderson and Brian Tamanaha,
are shaped by neoliberal assumptions and constructs.14 Indeed, the responses to
these proposals largely draw on these same assumptions and constructs.15 In
this Essay I aim to push at the bounds of the discourse on legal education
reform, to open space for more “social” responses to the crises facing law
schools, and to raise a thread of clinical practice as a model and guidepost for
legal education.
In addition to confronting resistances and pressures within clinical
education, it is essential—in this period of crisis for legal education—for legal
academics to set forth a progressive vision of legal education linking expansive
social vision with pedagogical goals. I seek to articulate a new set of
aspirations for legal education: a vision of law schools that defend community
and solidarity against the effects of concentrated wealth and subordination
along multiple dimensions of identity, status, and power; a vision of law
schools that confront the structural changes in the market for legal services and
originate new modalities of legal practice. The neoliberal reformers of U.S.
legal education appear to ignore the dialectical relationship between law
schools and the legal profession. The proposals assume a one-way relationship
in which disaggregated and commodified legal functions must lead to a
restructuring of legal education and the law school curriculum.16 This partial
understanding is dangerous. When the profession has lost its moorings under an
onslaught of economic forces, law schools have the opportunity, if not the
responsibility, to make interventions that emphasize non-market, justice values.
Clinical practice with expansive social vision is one such intervention in
the profession and in the market, and can be a core generator of new visions for
legal practice. To serve in this role, clinics must be embedded in an ecosystem
of legal and non-legal actors, organizations, and networks. Clinics, because
they are the primary sites of actual practice in legal education, can make law
schools central nodes in these networks. In short, this Essay argues that we
need to further the moves from insular, extractive legal education toward
connected, cogenerative learning and practice centers. Moving from extraction
to cogeneration expands the pedagogical repertoire of new vision law schools

13. WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 22–30; Heidi Boghosian, The
Amorality
of
Legal
Andragogy,
3
STAN.
AGORA
1
(2002),
http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume2/articles/boghosian/boghosian.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LVZ2J2UG].
14. See infra Part I.C for discussion of these proposals.
15. See generally, e.g., Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014) (finding that the present value of a law degree typically
exceeds its cost for most law school graduates).
16. See infra Part I.C for discussion of these proposals.
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and makes them more relevant in the evolving worlds of both private and
public sector practice.
Part I begins by focusing on the forces—both internal and external—
buffeting clinical legal education at this point in its modern history. It then
considers major legal education reform proposals in this period of law school
crisis and the background ideologies and commitments shaping those
proposals. In Part II, I describe two problem areas on which we are currently
working in the UC Irvine Immigrant Rights Clinic: mandatory immigration
detention and conditions of work for low-wage immigrant workers in the
warehouse industry. Part 0 describes two bases of knowledge that we aim to
excavate from our focus on those problem areas: “deep critique” and
“democratic lawyering.” Finally, in Part 0, I outline the opportunities and
constraints within legal education for a progressive reform vision.
The economic crisis in legal education may compel us to accept the
profession as it is now: transitory, disaggregated, outsourced, and
commodified. Visionary reform will build on the core public values of the legal
profession and recognize that our students need to be flexible and
experimentalist problem solvers, working through complex issues in
collaboration with clients and communities. Clinical practice that teaches
critical systemic thinking and democratic lawyering has the potential to be an
engine of renewal and reform.
I.
RESISTANCES AND PRESSURES
Disaggregating legal functions and undervaluing professional judgment
threaten broad social vision for law schools in a rare period of ferment and
reform. Duncan Kennedy argued that “[s]ocial justice is everywhere [in legal
education], but it’s disintegrated and politicized under pluralist rules that
require some of everything to be there, so that the school can maintain its
reputation as a representative law faculty and avoid being treated as
marginal.”17 It would be wise for law school faculty and administrators to look
beyond the established pedagogical canon and individual student training, to
refrain from viewing students as passive consumers of legal information, and to
work to reform donor interests. However, as I briefly set out below, there are
obstacles both within and outside clinical legal education that may foreclose
generative reform.
A. Path Dependency
An earlier vision of social change lawyering materialized in the 1970s,
during the development of a network of federally funded legal services offices
17. Duncan Kennedy, The Social Justice Element in Legal Education in the United States, 1
UNBOUND 93, 103 (2005).
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with “back-up” centers in particular areas of the law.18 Legal services attorneys
aspired to provide excellent representation in select areas in which poor clients
faced difficulty, including benefits, housing, and family law,19 often with the
government as an adversary in judicial and administrative forums. There were
competing emphases as federally funded legal services expanded, including
(1) strategic litigation developed from large caseloads; (2) experiments in the
holistic socio-legal provision of services, with lawyers collaborating with social
workers and psychologists; and/or (3) development of a paradigm of service
provision centered in individual casework and client engagement in
neighborhood legal services offices.20 These features were at least partly a
consequence of critiques of public interest law as practiced up to that point.
The War on Poverty and the Great Society embodied an emphasis on localism
distinct from the more centralized New Deal anti-poverty programs.21 Within
public interest law, Derrick Bell challenged the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(NAACP LDF) on the ground that the much-lauded LDF campaign
culminating in Brown v. Board of Education was lawyer-led and relatively
unaccountable to affected communities.22
Like any dynamic field in which programs face internal and external
political pressures, the localist legal services paradigm itself came under
criticism by progressive scholars beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s.23 The
progressive critique had its roots in critical legal studies. Rick Abel argued that
emphasizing legalism in local anti-poverty advocacy was at best ineffectual,
and at worst a reinforcement of entrenched power relations in society.24 Lucie
White illustrated her profound discomfort with the narrowness of legal process
and legal remedies in traditional poverty law practice.25 Gerald Lopez proposed
a literal rearrangement of the interior of legal services offices, and his work has

18. See Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor—A Commentary,
83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1682–83 (1995).
19. See Rebecca Sharpless, More than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in
Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 347, 351 (2012).
20. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 32–34 (1993).
21. See Thomas J. Sugrue, All Politics Is Local: The Persistence of Localism in TwentiethCentury America, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
HISTORY 301, 301–26 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003).
22. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
23. There was also a sustained conservative attack on legal services that gained strength during
the Reagan Administration and continues to this day. See Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess:
Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 761–71 (2002).
24. See generally Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced
Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985).
25. See generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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encouraged many law students to blur the lines between law, organizing, and
social work in their practice.26
The progressive critique significantly altered public interest practice.
Those law students most influenced by those works moved into public interest
practice in the 1990s and 2000s. They were largely outside the localist legal
services infrastructure, portions of which were withering due to defunding and
federal restrictions on advocacy. A small group of organizations and law school
clinics, as well as a few reinvigorated legal services offices, advanced the latest
iterations of social change lawyering. Private entities are now more prominent
adversaries of public interest lawyers, and diminished government agencies
undertake limited intervention on behalf of indigent clients in private ordering.
Public interest lawyers practice in a broader range of areas, from foreclosure to
education, to workers’ rights, to environmental advocacy. The practice is more
global as lawyers face multi-national employers and financial institutions,
represent individuals and organizations with cross-border ties, and use human
rights law and forums to fight poverty and marginalization within the United
States.27 Public interest law finds itself in a very different environment, with
new adversaries across a range of subject areas. The open question is whether
path-dependent legal education, including law school clinics, has kept up with
changes in the field.
B. External Discipline and Austerity
When law school clinics have attempted to move away from providing
individual legal services or describing a more expansive social mission for
themselves, commentators within the field have been critical on pedagogical
grounds or have expressed discomfort with the possible incongruity with
students’ political commitments.28 In addition to the self-generated
compunctions regarding the “imposition” of faculty political commitments on
students, there are the more obvious external pressures that governments place
on clinics to prevent challenges to powerful corporate interests with which they
are allied.29 Other commentators have argued that clinicians increasingly evade
their responsibility to abide by a “service” model of legal advocacy and lean

26. GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992).
27. See generally Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57
DUKE L.J. 891 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Praveen Kosuri, Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical
Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 337–38, 342 (2012); April Land, “Lawyering
Beyond” Without Leaving Individual Clients Behind, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 47, 54–59 (2011); Stephen
F. Reed, Clinical Legal Education at a Generational Crossroads: A Self-Focused Self-Study of Self, 17
CLINICAL L. REV. 243, 249–52 (2010).
29. See generally Robert R. Kuehn & Bridget M. McCormack, Lessons from Forty Years of
Interference in Law School Clinics, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2011).
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toward “issue” advocacy because they seek elevated faculty status.30 Finally,
commentators have objected to clinics with an expansive social vision of
human rights by relying on an inherent and zero-sum dichotomy between
politics and pedagogy.31
Path dependency and an aversion to educators explicitly invoking political
commitments undergird these critical, disciplinary interventions in clinical
legal education. In this way, the modern neoliberal critics’ views about clinics
with an expansive social vision coincide with those of both path-dependent
clinicians, focused nearly exclusively on economically triaged individual legal
services, and the original conservative critics of the Legal Services
Corporation. The possibility suggested in the post-Carnegie era—one of lowcost externships and apprenticeships replacing in-house and live client clinics
undertaking complex politicized work—has increased as the economic crisis
has unfolded. Further, the austerity regime of a shrinking government sector
has hit legal services and public defender offices hard, as those offices grapple
with increasing economic and social inequality, and has thus strengthened the
call for service clinics.32 Both the economic crisis within U.S. legal education
and the austerity regime, stemming from the same macroeconomic forces
unleashed by infirmities in the financial sector, have come together to threaten
visions of clinical education extending beyond service to individual indigent
clients or future private sector employers.
C. Neoliberal Reform
Neoliberal assumptions and constructs operate on the broader field of
legal education reform as well. “Neoliberalism” is a contested term used
sparingly in the legal academic literature. Like David Singh Grewal and
Jedediah Purdy, I believe that the term has strong explanatory power and thus
use it in multiple contexts in this Essay. Grewal and Purdy define neoliberalism
by referring to the following cluster of features:
30. Margaret Drew & Andrew P. Morriss, Clinical Legal Education & Access to Justice:
Conflicts, Interests, & Evolution, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE FOR AMERICANS
OF AVERAGE MEANS (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14)
(“Our conclusion from this brief review of the development of clinical legal education is that
clinicians’ search for equivalent status and/or rents within the academy played an important role in the
shift to diversify away from the service clinic model.”). This analysis of clinician motives is strikingly
devoid of supporting evidence.
31. Eric A. Posner, The Human-Rights Charade, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://chronicle.com/article/Peace-LoveGrandstanding/149961 [http://perma.cc/2ZAX-AV2H] (“An
argument could be made that political advocacy has pedagogical value. That is possible. But if the goal
is political, the pedagogical value is secondary, and likely to be compromised.”). But see Sital
Kalantry, Eric Posner Has a Narrow Understanding of Human-Rights Clinics, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Nov. 24, 2014), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2014/11/24/eric-posner-doesntunderstand-human-rights [http://perma.cc/TVQ7-5MDM].
32. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 175 (2012) (“If understaffed legal services
offices were offered the full-time assistance of the third-year class of local law schools, that would
help fill unmet needs while the students get useful training.”).
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Neoliberalism, like classical liberalism before it, is also associated
with a kind of ideological expansionism, in which market-modeled
concepts of efficiency and autonomy shape policy, doctrine, and other
discourses of legitimacy outside of traditionally “economic” areas. . . .
Neoliberalism, then, takes its meaning from this contest between
market imperatives and democratic demands; it names a suite of
arguments, dispositions, presuppositions, ways of framing questions,
and even visions of social order that get called on to press against
democratic claims in the service of market imperatives.33
David Harvey emphasizes the expansive, political nature of the neoliberal
project.34 In the realm of education specifically, neoliberalism facilitates
market dominance as the “privileged domain of measuring and regulating
human worth.”35 Wendy Brown speaks to the foundational changes wrought by
neoliberal ideas in higher education: “Once about developing intelligent,
thoughtful elites and reproducing culture, and more recently, enacting a
principle of equal opportunity and cultivating a broadly educated citizenry,
higher education now produces human capital, thereby turning classically
humanist values on their head.”36
Some have used the current moment of crisis within legal education to
advocate a reform program that seeks to meet private employers’ demands.37
Prominent legal academics such as William Henderson and Brian Tamanaha
have proposed reforms that share features with the market-based approaches
advocated by the American Law Deans Association38 and the Cato Institute.39

33. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3–4 (2014) (emphasis added).
34. “In so far as neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting
as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs,’ it emphasizes
the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace. It holds that the social good will be
maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all
human action into the domain of the market.” DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM
3 (2005) (endnote omitted).
35. Christopher Breu, The Post-Political Turn: Theory in the Neoliberal Academy, in CAPITAL
AT THE BRINK: OVERCOMING THE DESTRUCTIVE LEGACIES OF NEOLIBERALISM 241, 242 (Jeffrey R.
Di Leo & Uppinder Mehan eds., 2014).
36. WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 24
(2015).
37. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013);
James E. Moliterno, The Future of Legal Education Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 423 (2013);
Symposium, The Future of Law, Business, and Legal Education: How to Prepare Students to Meet
Corporate Needs, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 137 (2013); Casey Hall, How Daniel Katz is Working to Reinvent
the Law, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013) http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters
.com/law-and-techology/daniel-katz-working-reinvent-law [http://perma.cc/Y9RJ-HX6M].
38. See, e.g., Pub. Comment on the Application of the Am. Bar Ass’n for Reaffirmation of
Recognition by the Sec’y of Educ. as a Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agency in the Field of
Legal Educ., Am. Law Deans Ass’n (undated), http://www.nacua.org/documents/ALDA
_Comment.pdf [http://perma.cc/AB4K-9VZZ] (arguing that ABA imposes requirements on accredited
law schools that are not only extrinsic to educational quality but also intrusive on institutional
autonomy).
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Henderson argues for a backwards design of legal education based on
collaborations with leading employers in the restructured market for legal
services.40 He suggests that both incumbent firms and newly ascendant
companies created to disaggregate (and outsource) legal functions would help
law schools retool to produce the legal workers needed in the new economy for
legal services.41 Tamanaha’s main proposal is to bifurcate legal education, with
a first tier of research institutions largely in line with the vision of law schools
embedded in current ABA accreditation rules, and a second tier of schools with
untenured faculty focusing to a much greater degree on practical skills
training.42 In place of clinics, which reformers describe as too expensive to
scale up to cover all students, Tamanaha argues for a shortened law school
program at the second tier schools with a third year of apprenticeship at private
and public interest firms.43
The economic crisis in U.S. legal education has skewed the reform
discourse toward market-based solutions, with little to no attention paid to the
profession’s justice imperative, as articulated by West and legal profession
scholars such as Susan Carle44 and Deborah Rhode.45 Professional norms
encompass a broader set of values than the market may demand in any given
moment. Those values are mutually reinforcing; clients seek out lawyers
because they believe lawyers have competencies and a degree of social power
in complex systems of governance. That social power relies, at least in part, on
the idea that lawyers are part of a justice-seeking profession with some
commitment to the greater good.46 The neoliberal reforms further marginalize
39. See WALTER OLSON, SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE: LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN
OVERLAWYERED AMERICA (2011).
40. Henderson, supra note 37, at 462–63 (“On the most basic level, it is clear that law schools
must become more attuned to legal employers—we need professional employment for our graduates
to keep the doors open. . . . [W]e are making business decisions designed to get our institutions to
places of safety; we are not making pronouncements of our social, political, or aesthetic values.”).
41. Id. To be clear, it is essential that legal educators understand (and interpret) foundational
changes in the market for legal services, both for the sake of accurate scholarly approaches to the field
and to adjust pedagogical methods for the employment market that our graduates face. See infra Part
IV.C. What is troubling is Henderson’s single-minded and over-determined focus on the
disaggregation and technological change in a portion of the market; his arguments are too narrow to
apply to U.S. legal education as a whole.
42. TAMANAHA, supra note 32, at 174 (“The law school parallel—in program and pricing—of
vocational colleges and community colleges will come into existence, many of two-year duration.
Research-oriented law schools will remain as they are.”).
43. Id. at 175; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar
Eligibility After Two Years of Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2012) (arguing for
apprenticeships in place of a third year of law school).
44. See Susan D. Carle, Introduction to LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 1–11 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005).
45. Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009).
46. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (“Cause lawyers
thus reconnect law and morality and make tangible the idea that lawyering is a ‘public profession,’ one
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the public-oriented, justice-seeking elements of legal professional identity and
undermine the profession as a whole.
II.
CENTERING SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Rather than design backwards from the perspective of economic actors in
a portion of the shifting market for legal services, law schools must put large,
complex social problems at the center of their curricula. This preserves
essential aspects of the legal profession’s commitment to seek justice, and
teaches transferable approaches to lawyering in a time of foundational change.
This Part sets forth two problem areas on which we are focused in the UC
Irvine Immigrant Rights Clinic.47 Although the work is challenging to
undertake and to contextualize in the clinical setting, it contains a set of
generative aspirations for legal education. These two projects contain many of
the features of the new forms, contexts, and challenges of public interest law as
described in Part I.A. They both involve powerful private entities (in one case
due to government outsourcing). The state has a limited and contingent
protective role in one project and is the prosecutor of our clients in the other.
Both projects involve multiple areas of law and are driven by global economic
shifts and migration. Through our intake, we consciously move toward projects
that evoke the political,48 and this puts our students in varied and multi-faceted
modes of public interest practice.
A. Mandatory Immigration Detention
After running a small pilot project, we assigned nearly every student in
the clinic to provide limited representation to mandatorily detained immigrants
in bond hearings at the Adelanto Detention Center, ninety miles northeast of

whose contribution to society goes beyond the aggregation, assembling, and deployment of technical
skills. In this way lawyers committed to using their professional work as a vehicle to build the good
society help legitim[ize] the legal profession as a whole.” (footnotes omitted)).
47. Although sometimes denigrated by non-clinical colleagues, clinicians often develop and
deconstruct written case studies from their practice with students to derive pedagogical insight and,
less frequently, to make interventions in policy, doctrinal, and legal profession debates. Although there
are strengths and weaknesses to this scholarly approach, reflective analysis of one’s practice has the
possibility of generating theories of pedagogy and praxis. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157,
170 (1994) (“Reflection must be central to such a clinic’s work because the fundamental goal of the
clinic itself is to build theory—to increase our practical knowledge about the settings in which we
work and the methods of lawyering and teaching that we might use. Because building grounded theory
is the clinic’s fundamental goal, scholarship—descriptive, critical, and prescriptive writing—must be
an integral part of its work.”).
48. See Sameer M. Ashar, Fieldwork and the Political, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION
OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 288, 288 (Susan Bryant et al.
eds., 2014) (“The challenge then lies in figuring out how to keep ‘the political’—alternative
conceptions of society as articulated by those excluded from the established social structure—at the
surface in clinical legal education.”).
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Irvine. Students worked on these cases in addition to their primary litigation
and non-litigation projects largely focused on civil rights and workers’ rights.
The use of immigration detention by the U.S. government has risen at an
alarming rate in the last decade. In fiscal year 2014 (FY2014), U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took 425,728 individuals into
custody.49 The government requested approximately $5 million per day in
FY2014 to house immigration detainees.50 Although immigration detention is
civil in nature, detainees experience it as punitive, and conditions can be as
harsh as those in the criminal system.51 One major contributor to the rise in
immigration detention was the 1996 enactment of a statute requiring the
mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted of a wide range of criminal
offenses, including minor drug offenses.52 Individuals who already have a
removal order and those considered “[a]rriving aliens” are also subject to
mandatory detention.53 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld mandatory detention
by a 5-to-4 vote in Demore v. Kim.54 However, recent U.S. circuit court
decisions have limited Demore’s holding and the application of mandatory
detention statutes, finding that due process requires detainees to receive an
individualized bond hearing.55 Our students represent clients in bond
proceedings at the six-month mark in their period of detention, in accordance
with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez v. Robbins.56
The Adelanto facility is operated by the GEO Group, a publicly traded
corporation.57 The facility is located in a remote part of San Bernardino
County, east of Los Angeles, in an area called the high desert. Imagine a
plateau in the middle of mountain ranges, sparsely marked by Joshua trees and
tall metal towers carrying electrical lines. Subdivisions of suburban homes and
strip malls sprout up in the high desert along Route 395 with great speed. In
this area, the detention center is an economic development project. But it is

49. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-iceimmigration-removals.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG4Y-FGA6].
50. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY
COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES (2013),
http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-Immigation-Detention-August2013-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5CL-H6XA].
51. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014).
52. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 303, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 585–87 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012)) (amending section 236 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act).
53. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2014).
54. 538 U.S. 510 (2002).
55. E.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Preap v. Johnson, 303 F.R.D.
566 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
56. See 715 F.3d at 1127.
57. Adelanto Detention Facility, GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.geogroup.com/maps
/locationdetails/35 [http://perma.cc/G64X-58DN] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
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short-term development.58 Buses with the jolly green GEO logo transport
young men from jails and prisons in Los Angeles County and Orange County
to Adelanto each day. That same logo flies on a flag outside of the facility,
alongside the California State and United States flags.
Because of Adelanto’s distance from downtown Los Angeles, the lack of
local development in the proximate area, and the general paucity of legal
resources for indigent immigrants, few detainees have legal representation or
the capability to find an attorney through familial and community networks.
The facility currently holds up to 1,300 men, and plans are underway to add
another 650 beds, including a women’s housing unit.59 Men in orange
jumpsuits are made idle by their confinement, behind high metal fences topped
with barbed wire, far from their families. The facility houses the courtrooms for
three immigration judges, which seem out of place, except that this appears to
be an improvement over the use of videoconferencing to beam detainees into
courtrooms far away in downtown Los Angeles.60
B. Conditions of Work in the Warehouse Industry
A second clinic project is both distinct from and significantly related to
the first. We have been working with the Warehouse Workers Resource Center
(WWRC) for several years, providing legal information to workers through
periodic one-day clinics in the Inland Empire region. The foreclosure crisis hit
the area hard, and it has experienced double-digit unemployment rates since the
2008 recession. However, 40 percent of imports into the United States flow
through the Long Beach and Los Angeles ports, and land is cheap in the
region.61 Real estate developers have built four hundred million square feet of
warehouse space, fueled partly by the growth of e-commerce.62 One who drives
through the region on Interstate 15 sees acres and acres of beige boxes
stretching out in the midst of vast fields, in addition to the requisite
subdivisions and strip malls.63 (Perhaps not accidentally, the warehouses look
much like the Adelanto detention facility.) An economist estimated that the
average wage for non-professional workers in the industry is $22,000 per year,

58. Economists Arjun Jayadev and Samuel Bowles argue that the growth of the “guard labor”
sector globally is based on expenditures borne of mistrust and not an especially generative use of
capital. Arjun Jayadev & Samuel Bowles, Guard Labor, 79 J. DEV. ECON. 328 (2006).
59. Kate Linthicum, Expansion of Adelanto Immigrant Detention Center Underway, L.A.
TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-ff-adelanto-immigration-20140709story.html [http://perma.cc/T9DC-35F7].
60. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
61. See Gabriel Thompson, The Workers Who Bring You Black Friday, NATION (Dec. 16,
2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/177377/holiday-crush [http://perma.cc/4CU6-BQ6R].
62. Id.
63. Id.
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and even less for those who are not direct employees but work for temporary
agencies.64 The warehouse industry is largely unorganized.
A clinic team has been investigating work conditions at a mid-sized
warehouse operation holding merchandise for major retailers, including Macy’s
and Costco. Current and former workers approached WWRC seeking
assistance. The workers alleged the following work conditions:
• unsanitary and nonfunctioning bathrooms;
• lack of safe drinking water;
• unsafe operation of forklifts, including their use as ladders to retrieve
heavy boxes from the tops of high shelves;
• employees working seven days per week and as much as twelve hours
per day, yet not receiving the premium pay allowed to them under
state and federal law;
• unreimbursed work time after workers have clocked out and use of
their own vehicles to bring goods to shippers;
• up to thirty minutes unpaid wait time each morning to clock in for
work;
• termination for refusing to comply with forced overtime, with women
workers told that they should not have had children for which they
were obligated to care;
• lack of promotional opportunities for women, who were told that they
were not qualified for higher paying jobs.65
Like the clinic’s prior work with hotel industry workers in a series of
cases,66 it appears that the bodies of low-wage immigrant workers are exploited
for as much labor as managers can derive at the least cost.67 Sophisticated
human resources programs that measure the productivity of individual workers
in real-time are called “electronic whips” because of their use by managers to
drive workers and to discipline and terminate them.68 Brands with hundreds of
millions in revenue are undergirded by the nickel and diming of those lowest in
the supply chain, not just in the United States but perhaps more brutally in the
Asian countries where the warehoused goods are manufactured.69
64. Id.
65. Memorandum from the UC Irvine IRC student team to file (Nov. 14, 2014) (on file with
author).
66. See Sameer M. Ashar et al., Advancing Low-Wage Worker Organizing Through Legal
Representation, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313 (2013).
67. See Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 105 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
68. See G. Stoney Alder, Ethical Issues in Electronic Performance Monitoring: A
Consideration of Deontological and Teleological Perspectives, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 729, 735 (1998);
Karen Levy, The Future of Work: What Isn’t Counted Counts, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/the-future-of-work-what-isnt-counted-counts
[http://perma.cc/P494-AAT6].
69. See, e.g., Jason Burke, Bangladesh Factory Collapse Leaves Trail of Shattered Lives,
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/bangladesh-factory-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686369

208

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:193

III.
DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE BASES
What do we make of these areas of work in the context of clinical legal
education? Clinical practice generally corrects for deficiencies in legal
education simply by putting students in the role as advocates for clients. First,
there are the established and significant benefits of learning traditional legal
techniques in a low-volume, highly supervised context.70 This occurs in any
well-taught clinic in which students represent clients—civil or criminal, group
or individual, big or small cases. Second, through clinic cases and projects,
students come to understand—in the words of Elizabeth Mertz—the content of
“conflict stories,” instead of focusing solely on the holdings of cases and
corresponding legal authority.71 They develop facts and case theories rather
than receiving them as given.
Both the mandatory detention and warehouse labor projects offer the
foundational benefits of in-house, live client clinical education. In the Adelanto
project, students have a closely supervised in-court experience representing
clients before immigration judges. They engage in fact investigation and
development, legal research and writing, and client examination in court;
defend against government cross-examination; and make closing arguments.
Students also negotiate directly with ICE attorneys regarding the terms of bond
releases. If the clinic secures the release of any detainees, such detainees’
chances of obtaining representation to fight the merits of their removal cases
improve significantly. In the warehouse project, the clinic team has met with
groups of workers at the office of our partner organization over multiple
weekends. Law students have provided the workers with legal information
while gathering facts to undergird potential legal action. They move from facts
in casebooks to facts in life.72
These projects have the potential to do even more pedagogical work in
law schools. If we understand the work as cogenerative rather than extractive,
we may develop student capacity in a few less developed and articulated areas
of professional development, as set forth in the following Sections. These
knowledge bases run contrary to both entrenched forms of doctrinal legal
education, as well as the neoliberal reform approaches, in that they move away

building-collapse-community [http://perma.cc/A59P-44KB]; Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In
China, Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-forworkers-in-china.html [http://perma.cc/MVA2-6TME].
70. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 120–22.
71. Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 494–95 (2007). Mertz, in her linguistic study of the typical first
year curriculum, concludes “[t]he move to focus on form, authority, and legal-linguistic contexts is
thus accompanied by a shift away from precision or depth in discussions of content, morality, and
social context.” Id. at 496.
72. See id. at 495.
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from an individualistic, formal understanding of law to a more social,
contextualized understanding.73
A. Deep Critique
Students have the opportunity to gain knowledge about social and
economic structures from these projects. To fight to change the systems
through which our clients are subordinated is an aspiration that runs across
generations.74 This aspiration is one that we demonstrate in our approach to
client representation and in the content of seminars and case discussions. It is
perhaps demonstrated most emphatically in the intake rationale of clinicians,75
which is often largely invisible to students. Gary Blasi said in 1994,
“[s]tructuralist theories may not capture all that exists, but ignoring structure
risks missing nearly everything.”76
Clinics may attempt to develop structural analysis and methods of
resistance to hegemonic oppression, but against a backdrop of disaggregation
and relative disorganization. The historian Daniel Rogers argues:
[I]n the last quarter of the century, through more and more domains of
social thought and argument, the terms that had dominated post-World
War II intellectual life began to fracture. One heard less about society,
history, and power and more about individuals, contingency, and
choice. The importance of economic institutions gave way to notions
of flexible and instantly acting markets. History was said to accelerate
into a multitude of almost instantaneously accessible possibilities.
Identities became fluid and elective. Ideas of power thinned out and
receded.77
Disaggregation and neoliberalism are perfect and complementary bedfellows.
If we cannot escape the box of our pervasive reality and of goods manufactured
and assembled by workers in buildings surrounded by suicide nets,78 then even
the location of such efforts within our particular social structure will undermine
our efforts to resist it. The philosopher David Hoy brings this to the surface in
Critical Resistance: “The general point is that utopian imaginings of freedom

73. Thanks to Rachel Moran for this insight.
74. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L.
REV. 355 (2008); Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School
Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (2004).
75. See Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Encouraging Reflection on and Involving Students in the
Decision to Begin Representation, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 357 (2010); Jayashri Srikantiah & Jennifer
Lee Koh, Teaching Individual Representation Alongside Institutional Advocacy: Pedagogical
Implications of a Combined Advocacy Clinic, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 451 (2010).
76. Gary L. Blasi, What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship,
48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1091 (1994); see Edward Rubin, Why Law Schools Do Not Teach
Contracts and What Socioeconomics Can Do About It, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55 (2004).
77. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 5 (2011); see Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism,
Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 697 (1992).
78. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 69.
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may not be aware of the extent to which they presuppose the patterns of
oppression that they are resisting.”79
This is the field in which we operate, which requires us to develop in
ourselves and in our students the capacity of deep critique, of thinking beneath
and beyond liberal legalist approaches to social problems. We can develop this
capacity only through collaborative work with people, communities, and
thinkers at the margins of our social structure. The clinical standpoint,
alongside our bond clients in immigration court, is significant. Our students
gather “local knowledge,” in the words of Clifford Geertz,80 about the home
communities from which our clients come, as well as how legal regimes bear
down on them, even confining them in prisons or prison-like workplaces. We
discover that power has reconfigured the land,81 so that people are dispossessed
by law82 and made vulnerable to fractured systems of neoliberal production.83
As we trace the expansion of the immigration enforcement system from the
border to the interior, and the withdrawal of government from a mediating role
in the employer-employee relationship, we unearth why things are the way they
are. Both the mandatory detention and warehouse labor projects cause us to
question the efficacy of quasi-adversarial systems in which power is decidedly
tilted toward the state or powerful private interests.84
However, the clinical standpoint is necessary but not sufficient. History
and critical theory denaturalize the worlds our students confront through the
practice of poverty law.85 History and theory give us the tools to engage in

79. DAVID COUZENS HOY, CRITICAL RESISTANCE: FROM POST-STRUCTURALISM TO POSTCRITIQUE 3 (2004). Thanks to Nisha Agarwal and Jocelyn Simonson for introducing me to the work
of David Hoy. See Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer:
Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455 (2010).
80. Mertz, supra note 71, at 486 n.6 (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 234 (3d ed. 2000)).
81. See Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor, 1
DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & SOC’Y 1 (2012).
82. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Color and Colonialism: Racial Realism and Settler
Colonial Theory, 11 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Andrea Smith, The Moral Limits of
the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement, 2 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 69
(2012).
83. See HARVEY, supra note 34, at 159 (“The main substantive achievement of
neoliberalization, however, has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, wealth and income. I have
elsewhere provided an account of the main mechanisms whereby this was achieved under the rubric of
‘accumulation by dispossession’ . . . . The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of
legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes.”); DAVID WEIL, THE
FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO
IMPROVE IT (2014).
84. See Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra
note 67, at 1, 19–20 (on the reflexive and undermining turn to legalism by left movements).
85. Margaret E. Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and Clinical
Education, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161 (2005); see Helge Dedek, Stating Boundaries:
The Law, Disciplined, in STATELESS LAW, supra note ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED., at 9, 21
(“Yet the challenge levelled by ‘stateless law’ increases the pressure on the ‘discipline’ to leave the
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campaigns, alongside community organizations and political activists, to
change institutions of law. It is immensely difficult to maintain critical
consciousness in the trenches of daily warfare with hostile or indifferent
interests and with isolated clients. Organizers and other community actors
bring consciousness almost necessarily lacking in the circumscribed
relationship between lawyers and clients.86 Representing workers through
WWRC causes us to ask whether we are changing conditions for workers
across the industry through legal action. Organizers challenge us to
acknowledge the limits of adjudication and provide a broader understanding of
the possible scope of a grievance and the necessary social response. Racial
subordination is both everywhere and nowhere in our work in immigration
detention and in the warehouses of the Inland Empire.87 Collaboration with
organizers encourages our students to develop both justiciable and nonjusticiable narratives in the course of our representation of detainees and
workers.88 While critical and interdisciplinary perspectives can be explored in
law school classes and seminars, they cannot replicate the experience of an
immersive confrontation with an intractable social problem and close work
with clients and organizers on that problem.
B. Democratic Lawyering
Legal academics have originated theories of lawyering rooted in clinical
practice in waves of scholarship and program development. Gary Bellow coauthored the Lawyering Process with Bea Moulton and developed the Legal

trodden paths and become aware of the historically contingent factors that have come to define what
we do.”).
86. See Robert W. Gordon, Foreword to LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE,
supra note 44, at xiii.
87. It is striking how little participants in the clinical enterprise discuss the dynamics of racial
subordination in our legal practice. This may reflect the pull of color-blind ideologies within legal
education. It remains difficult to discuss subordination in clinical conversations, perhaps in the absence
of what Margaret Montoya calls the scaffolding of applied critical race theory in our pedagogy.
Margaret E. Montoya, Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the 2010 Conference on Clinical Legal
Education (May 6, 2010). Jean Koh Peters and Sue Bryant have done essential work in building a tool
set for teaching cultural competence. Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the Habits:
Teaching about Identity, Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF
LAWYERS, supra note 48, at 349. We need to think together about how to carry this consciousness to
clinical discussions about strategies and tactics that can be used against systems of social control and
racial subordination. See Jean Koh Peters & Susan Bryant, Talking about Race, in TRANSFORMING
THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, supra note 48, at 375. More than anything else, we need to exercise
vigilance and courage as we construct a more relevant and meaningful anti-subordination pedagogy.
88. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Unsettling the Lawyers: Other Forms of Justice in
Indigenous Claims of Expropriation, Abuse, and Injustice, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 620, 637 (2014)
(“Conventionally trained lawyers and judges may be limited in how they conceive of legal claims and
harms and be unable to enter into the subjective experience of those who experience harms and claims
not yet recognized by formal legal systems.”).
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Services Center with Jeanne Charn at Harvard.89 Tony Amsterdam developed a
systemized method of teaching litigation skills from which came the Lawyering
program at New York University School of Law.90 David Binder promoted an
intense focus on discrete skill development and shaped the clinical program at
UCLA School of Law to reflect this focus.91 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has
argued that a principal strength of clinical legal education is its potential for
theory generation, both about the substantive issues on which clinicians work
with their students, as well as about lawyering.92
Scholars in the first generation of clinical scholarship sought to elevate
the work of their colleagues in clinics and to inspire the development of ideas
and written work that might transform legal education and the profession. They
demonstrated that access to experience outside of law school could lead to
scholarship and teaching methodologies essential at both the micro-lawyering
and macro-system levels. Although these scholars continue to maintain an
unparalleled professional focus and record of social justice commitments and
achievements, they made a concerted effort to demonstrate the usefulness of
clinical teaching and scholarship across practice settings. They believed in the
transfer value of clinical education for students entering areas of practice that
might be quite different from the pro bono public interest practice of most
clinics. Perhaps this is the reason why, in some of the key writings on
lawyering theory, especially the work of Binder at UCLA, justice is sidelined
to the periphery rather than centered, in contrast to the approach advocated by
Robin West in her focus on doctrinal teaching.93 Clinical scholars demonstrated
the value of their theories of lawyering and took great care to defend the
enterprise against charges that it was insufficiently attentive to legal practice

89. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).
90. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution and Legal Education, in THE
CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1985, at 11 (Frank E. McArdle ed., 1987).
91. See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 10
CLINICAL L. REV. 191, 213–18 (2003) (encapsulating a skill-centered approach to clinical legal
education).
92. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980).
93. WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 43–61. But see Michael Meltsner,
Celebrating The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 327 (2003). On Bellow and Moulton’s
effort to bridge generic skills acquisition with the moral commitments and responsibilities of a lawyer,
Meltsner wrote:
The Lawyering Process straddled this fence also. It includes “skill dimensions,” that
encouraged clinicians to work on interviewing, counseling and negotiation as well as
readings that raise painful questions of both personal and professional morality. You cannot
work through its 1,121 pages without learning how to be a more effective practitioner
regardless of who your client is; on the other hand, it would also take a pronounced sense of
moral denial, one bordering on the morally inert, to avoid confronting in these pages the
question of the proper use of the powers they impart.
Id. at 347.
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outside of public interest law.94 To be overly concerned with justice in clinical
teaching and scholarship would be to relegate the new theories of lawyering to
the concerns of the few at law schools and in professional settings across the
United States.95 In this way, some of these works were responsive to the
neoliberal consensus in the legal profession in the 1980s and 1990s,96 or
interpreted as such to consolidate the neoliberal approach.97
Scholars also generated writings on multiple variations of progressive
lawyering with a more central justice focus. The works of Lucie White, Gerald
Lopez, and others critiqued the ways in which poor people received legal
services, as explored above in Part 0 of this Essay. Their affirmative visions of
legal practice have yet to find widespread purchase in standard law school
curricula. Ascanio Piomelli helpfully summarizes the collective aspirations that
scholars developed in reaction to these critiques in his description of
democratic lawyering. Democratic lawyering, according to Piomelli, is when
we “regularly work with people and groups involved in struggles for dignity,
survival, self-determination, and other basic human needs” and “seek to foster
and join collective efforts of low-income and working-class people and people
of color to reshape their own lives and communities,” “in short, to form and
support active publics—groups that come together to understand, confront, and
attempt to gain some control over the forces and actors shaping their lives.”98
The idea of “active publics” is essential.99 Daniel Fischlin, Ajay Heble, and
George Lipsitz argue, “[w]ithout concrete, self-active constituencies deciding
democratically the contours of acceptable human conduct, human rights can

94. See Binder & Bergman, supra note 91, at 302–03 (“Clinicians routinely lament the
tendency of non-clinical law school faculty and administrators to perceive clinicians as ‘second class
citizens.’ Yet the survey-type coverage to which the case-centered approach relegates lawyering skills
may contribute to this unwelcome attitude.”).
95. See Kennedy, supra note 17.
96. See Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 19 (2014).
97. Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that the effort to classify and mainstream clinical
methods through the “MacCrate Report,” AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (1992), may have unintentionally undermined the social justice foundation of
clinical legal education. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Comments at the Contemporary Perspectives on
Professional Education Session at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (May 30, 2015);
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from the
MacCrate Report—Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 622
(1994) (arguing for the teaching of “ethical consequentialism” in law schools, so as to incorporate
conceptions of the public good); see also Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the
21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REV. 573 (1994) (arguing for greater attention in legal education to
curtailment of legal services for the poor and accelerating economic inequality).
98. Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383,
1394 (2009).
99. See id.
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become a . . . discourse that regulates human suffering rather than prevents
it.”100
Practitioners who seek to resist participating in the regulation of human
suffering approach the work of lawyering by elevating methodological
commitments over substantive or tactical ones. Collaborators ask them to
employ a range of legal and political advocacy tactics with a range of social
justice ends defined in conjunction with them.101 Lawyers are not mere
conduits for clients’ justice aspirations with no politics of their own. Lawyers
always bring politics to their relationships with clients, even if the approach is
ostensibly apolitical.102 Practitioners aspire to co-construct legal projects and
social justice goals with activated groups of clients. Piomelli concisely
describes the work: “Democratic lawyers collaborate with and nurture
grassroots groups in which everyday people participate in multiple realms of
self-rule or self-government, including tactical and strategic deliberation,
public and behind-the-scenes leadership, joint public action, and joint
assessment of that action.”103 Sophisticated public interest lawyers consider
competing structures of collaboration with active publics.104 In contrast, Mertz
describes a curriculum that teaches law students to pick up any situation and
efficiently translate it into set legal categories.105
“Constrained legalism”106 and “tactical pluralism,”107 both terms defined
by Scott Cummings to describe the significant strategic features of the
collaborative relationships between lawyers and community groups, require
that legal teams assess the efficacy of legal action to accomplish goals set by
client groups. The slide into legalism is stayed, as students learn to understand
client goals and assess legal action as a means toward those goals, alongside a
range of other advocacy methods. We feel this acutely in the warehouse case,
in which we are poised to begin litigation, even without a larger understanding
of how such legal action might fit into the broader goal of industry
transformation. The ultimate aim is usually not the winning of a case or
100. DANIEL FISCHLIN ET AL., THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NOW: IMPROVISATION, RIGHTS, AND
THE ETHICS OF COCREATION xviii (2013).
101. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1879 (2007) (describing collaborative legal and organizing campaign on behalf of
restaurant workers).
102. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 297 (1996).
103. Piomelli, supra note 98, at 1391.
104. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103
(1992); Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 25 (2011).
105. Mertz, supra note 71, at 508.
106. Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM
62, 67–71 (2007).
107. Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study
of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1932 (2007).
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passage of a bill, but instead something headier and less clear, such as the
development of collective power. The open-ended nature of the search for legal
mechanisms by which to repair harms identified by communities speaks to the
larger pedagogical goal of preparing students to engage, in the words of Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, in “process pluralism,” particularly in response to difficult
historically and macro-politically entrenched problems.108 The tension between
social justice goals and legal means is not inherent. It is a product of the path
development of legal practice in which every dispute is characterized and
defined as one between individuals or between individuals and the state. The
law and organizing109 and cause lawyering110 literatures contest the shape of
current legal practice, and the actors in those narratives push at the boundaries
of legal practice as defined by the rules of ethical conduct and the less formal
conventions of local practice.
To be sure, the development of tactical and strategic analysis is possible
in individual client clinics with no relation to a broader social vision. However,
faculty will often add cases and projects to the docket because of the certainty
of the need for legal action, as determined by the supervisor or the client, rather
than the desire to solve a social problem, as defined collaboratively by lawyers
and clients.
In addition to the ability to assess the need for legal action, democratic
lawyers learn to collaborate with and nurture partners from the community,
mediate complex decision making within organizations and communities,111
frame social problems, and think carefully about power—how it is created,
distributed, used, and lost. Students move out of legal systems with
predetermined assignments of authority, in which poor people must plaintively
submit to judges and prosecutors possessing enormous power over their lives.
They are forced to think creatively and irreverently about reallocating power in
specific circumstances. They engage with clients who are collaborating with
others and, in some cases, with sophisticated political organizers. “Affective
solidarity” with groups of clients keeps lawyers involved in community, no
matter what type of practice they enter upon graduation.112 Appreciating the
plasticity of legal roles preserves motivation and works against individualistic
and formalistic assumptions in mainstream professional socialization.113
108. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 88.
109. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing,
48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001).
110. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004).
111. See Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines that Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and
Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469, 473 (discussing what lawyers can do to
make sure democratic “community-building” is real, not ritualized).
112. Piomelli, supra note 98, at 1393.
113. See id. at 1397–1408; Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1084–85 (“Although the depth of lawyer
bias and the force of color-blind neutrality hinder such identification and explanation, collaboratively
enlarging the scope of client participation in the ‘lawyering’ process through individual decision-
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Democratic lawyering deepens critique, both of formalistic lawyering roles and
of entrenched arrangements of power and resources in society.114
IV.
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Rather than inviting disruption and displacement,115 law schools presently
have the capacity to rediscover their purpose, reinvent their programs of study,
and activate students in joint learning and engagement with active publics.
Vexing “ill-structured” social problems116 ought to serve as the core vehicles
through which students learn about law and lawyering.117 Clinics are the
institutional mechanism through which this work comes into the four walls of
the law school. Clinics also carefully facilitate the presence of students and
faculty in law offices, basements, restaurant meeting rooms, church halls, and
other spaces outside of the university. Clinical practice with an expansive
social vision is central to thick legal education reform proposals that do not
hew to the current needs of private employers or austerity-era public entities.
Legal education, through clinics, has an essential role in generating new visions
of practice and undergirding the moral and ethical responsibilities of the
profession.118
A. Centering Clinical Legal Education
The marginalization of clinics in discussions about legal education reform
is surprising until one understands the underlying assumptions and constructs.
To justify significant deregulation, differentiated legal education, shortened
programs, a return to an apprentice or externship model, and deputization of
students to provide individual legal services, one must do so in the name of
making and collective action transforms practical judgment.”); Bennett, supra note 111, at 495–96
(“There is nothing static about any of the on-going, long-term relationships between actors engaged in
creating strong institutions for their communities; the lawyer-client bond is just one of those many
relationships. The community-based lawyer should anticipate reciprocating her client’s evolution.”).
114. Amna Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.L. EDUC. 352
(2015) (describing the ways in which the Black Lives Matter movement should be understood within
legal education).
115. Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong, NEW
YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine
[http://perma.cc/Y3YG-X9Y3].
116. Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community Economic
Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45 (2002).
117. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical
Education as Methodology, in THE COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INC.,
CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (1973); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in
Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 591 (1987) (“Under
Bellow’s definition of clinical education there is nothing inherently limiting about clinical education
other than using the student’s performance as a starting point for inquiry.”).
118. See Moran, supra note 8, at 17 (“Imagine a clinical program that recognized society’s need
for lawyers with social justice perspectives as well as the importance of preparing students for their
role as citizen-lawyers.”).
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practice-readiness. Clinical legal education complicates that simple story.
Rather than think critically about how to more effectively integrate clinical
education into the overall law school curriculum or how to have students work
on more complex matters in clinical settings, neoliberal reformers write off
clinical education as “expensive”119 and “artificial,”120 with second-class
clinicians cast as rent-seekers.121 These critics need to sideline clinical
education because it interferes with what is fundamentally a neoliberal
approach to legal education: market differentiation, commodification, and
students understood first as consumers and then as laboring cogs in law offices.
That students might learn about lawyering and the profession in non-market
spaces within the university setting appears intolerable. This is shortsighted and
revealing, as it exposes the background ideology that shapes the reform
discussion.
Robert Kuehn has deftly picked apart the assumption that increased
opportunities for student participation in clinics would increase law school
tuition.122 Kuehn reports the many causes of increased tuition: prioritizing
scholarship production of non-clinical faculty through lower teaching loads and
higher salaries; merit-based grants and aid in the ranking-driven competition
for students with high numerical entrance indicators; new construction of law
school buildings; higher administrative and support service costs; and required
payments by law schools to their universities.123 When schools need to make
cuts, as has been the case at most law schools since the 2008 economic crisis,
many fixate on the costs of clinical education.124 In fact, according to Kuehn’s
analysis of available data, 84 percent of law schools have the opportunity to
offer a clinical experience to every student without an increase in tuition.125
This dissonance appears to reflect a set of values about what is institutionally
necessary, as well as a reflexive attempt to protect the accumulated privilege
(and rent-seeking) embedded in the entrenched system of legal education. This
understanding may not quickly enable deans at the 82 percent of law schools
that do not guarantee clinical education126 to expand experiential offerings. But
it is essential that there be a degree of honesty about the range of costs borne by
119. TAMANAHA, supra note 32, at 172–73 (pointing out that clinical education is
uneconomical, not a solution to legal education’s long-term woes); Drew & Morriss, supra note 30,
manuscript at 4 (clinics are “more expensive on a per student-credit-hour basis than doctrinal
courses”); Henderson, supra note 37, at 502.
120. TAMANAHA, supra note 32, at 173 (“Law schools, at great expense, create artificial
practice settings within an academic institution although actual settings exist in the world of legal
practice. The economic inefficiency of this arrangement places an upper limit on the expansion of
clinics . . . .”).
121. Drew & Morriss, supra note 30, manuscript at 11.
122. Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2014).
123. Id. at 7–10.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 32–39.
126. Id. at 32–33 (“[O]nly 18% of law schools (36 of 202) presently require or guarantee a
clinical experience.”).
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students through their tuition. Many law schools have (again, reflexively)
prioritized faculty salaries, new buildings, and higher position in the rankings
over experiential education and community engagement.
More surprising than the cost fixation of neoliberal reformers, however, is
the apparent disregard of clinical practice by progressive reformers.127 Robin
West devotes a chapter of her otherwise deeply insightful book on the
existential crisis facing legal education to a discussion of how bifurcated
faculties of interdisciplinary scholars and clinicians prevent law students from
engaging in normative analysis of the law, critical theory, legalism, and legal
policy formulation for entrenched social problems.128 These misimpressions on
the part of a critical doctrinal scholar at a prominent law school with a rich,
varied, and expansive clinical program129 indicate that the (at times) externally
imposed and (at other times) internally sought isolation (or insulation) of
clinical law teachers must end. Here again we see evidence of accumulated
privilege and institutional inertia at work. To draw out the greatest synergies
with other coursework and the overall intellectual activity at a law school,
clinical teachers must be fully integrated in faculties and in governance. And
yet, particularly at higher-ranked schools, there is either a cognitive disconnect
or some degree of existential angst associated with creating parity across
faculties, including clinicians, legal writing teachers, and academic support
specialists. Colleagues in those sectors of the faculty are deemed marginal
because they lack scholarly productivity while they are often discouraged by
institutions from allocating time for intellectual pursuits over the direct
instruction of students. It is also sometimes true that individuals in those
categories embrace their marginality in exchange for autonomy and more
intense focus on direct student instruction (and, in the case of clinicians, client
services). Faculties must either develop more complex and inclusive criteria in
crediting institutional contributions (perhaps leading to a reconfigured
understanding of institutional worth) or provide colleagues in those marginal
sectors with time, resources, and perhaps the affirmative expectation that they
will engage in scholarly exchange, adjusted for the obligations owed by
clinicians to their clients.
While clinical legal education ought not to be the sole carrier of justice
concerns in U.S. law schools, it is essential that a progressive reform agenda be
127. But see Stephanie Dangel & Michael J. Madison, Innovators, Esq.: Training the Next
Generation of Lawyer Social Entrepreneurs, 83 UMKC L. REV. 967 (2015); Martha F. Davis,
Institutionalizing Legal Innovation: The (Re)Emergence of the Law Lab, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190
(2015). These authors use the modern language of innovation and entrepreneurship rather than
collectivist conceptions of social justice, but do so to advocate for law school focus on wide-ranging
social problems. See also Deborah J. Merritt, Student Choice, L. SCH. CAFE (Aug. 13, 2015, 6:02 PM),
http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/student-choice
[http://perma.cc/7C6X-Q9YZ]
(supporting
California State Bar proposal to require fifteen experiential credits).
128. WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 131–73.
129. As outlined in Part 0 of this Essay, supra, clinical legal education is complex—as complex
as the public interest legal ecosystem of which it is a part.
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centered on the sites of actual legal practice with marginalized people. This
also renews the commitment to social justice within clinical legal education,
even as it is tested by institutional and generational shifts.
B. Critical Systems Analysis
Lawyers do not possess the narratives that communities generate.
Lawyers are taught at an early point in their education to exercise detachment
and to assess factual stories without the benefit of preexisting moral or
communitarian commitments.130 Many law students experience this feature of
the curriculum as both energizing, because of the obvious disjuncture with their
previous lives, and depressing and disaggregating, for precisely the same
reason. Many law students are still in the midst of identity formation and
commitment definition when they arrive at law school. As law skeletonizes
facts to facilitate adjudication,131 it categorizes and reduces complex and
contradictory human experience.132 By bringing groups of clients into clinical
practice and giving students critical frames generated across disciplines, we
encourage them to put their newfound skills of categorization and reduction
into a broader, structural context. The goal is to give them the experience
necessary to interpret community narratives and to co-construct social
problems and potential legal responses, alongside clients.133 For some, this kind
of clinical practice may be the way “back in,” as Christine Zuni Cruz has
termed it,134 to reconnect students with communities,135 strengthened by adding
legal skills to their professional repertoire.
Are we truly able to get outside of the social structure in which we are
located to develop new means to resist the forces grinding down the minds and
bodies of our clients? Is our critique deep enough? Not yet, for sure. But this is
a knowledge base—a struggle of thought and imagination, really—that merits
our full attention. Our students are learning about intersecting systems of legal
130.
131.

See Mertz, supra note 71.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 170 (3d ed. 2000).
132. It is important to acknowledge that this, too, is “experiential education.” JOHN DEWEY,
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE 26 (1938) (“It is a great mistake to suppose, even tacitly, that the
traditional schoolroom was not a place in which pupils had experiences.”).
133. See Bellow, supra note 102; Bennett, supra note 111, at 495 (“Made explicit, the
happenstance interchanges between client and lawyer can be transformed into a ‘learning loop’ that
resembles the function performed by the ‘learning community.’”). One outstanding question is
whether the limited contacts that may occur between lawyers and poor clients are characterized by
honest and critical evaluation of legal and life options and with the values of each party at the surface
of the communication. See STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (2009).
134. Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999).
135. Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1083 (“A transformative commitment to difference-based
identity and antisubordination practice norms commands the abandonment of neutrality claims in
rendering lawyer judgments about the means and ends of representation.”).
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power, such as the immigration and criminal justice systems. So many are
mandatorily confined at the Adelanto facility due to over-policing in
communities of color and vague and expansive gang injunctions borne of a
race-based war on drugs. Our students become keenly aware of the flaws in the
criminal justice system through immigration bond representation. Our students
are also deeply conscious of the fact that a profit-seeking, publicly traded
corporation operates the detention facility in close collusion with the state. Are
we engaged in critical resistance? Again, not yet. But in this work are the seeds
of pedagogical goals and methods that have the potential to transform the
relationship between the profession and the social problems that directly
implicate law, as taught in U.S. law schools.136
The projects described in this Essay, the types of critiques referenced—
against exploitative employers and an over-criminalizing state—as well as the
terminology used (“progressive” versus “neoliberal”) appear to indicate strong
political bias, which in turn may be used to argue against a clinic-centered
program of legal education reform. Opponents such as Eric Posner use the leftleaning projects of human rights clinics to argue against the existence of those
clinics.137 Drew and Morriss indicate a preference for individual service
provision over larger advocacy projects in clinics. This posture is reminiscent
of the attacks on the Legal Services Corporation waged by conservative
opponents over many years, which succeeded in eliminating the capacity of
those lawyers to engage in class action litigation and to represent
undocumented immigrants.138 These strategies of delegitimization are wellworn and themselves evidence of entrenched political bias. By trimming the
sails of law school clinics, opponents (and path-dependent proponents) avoid
even minor disturbances in the distribution of power and resources in the
United States through law or legal action. Rather than taking out the adversary
by grounding critiques in unsupported arguments about pedagogy or relative
expense, opponents should speak directly as to why they believe these issues
and problems ought not to be a part of the law school curriculum. Why
shouldn’t we study the failure of state regulation in the market for globalized
low-wage labor? Or the inefficiency of immigrant detention and the rent
seeking of private prison companies? Unfortunately, the charge of political bias
in educational contexts is often an attempt to hide opposing political bias and to
preserve the status quo.
The less contentious response to the charge of political bias is simply that
clinics with social vision may be guided by a diverse set of values and

136. But see Fred Moten & Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons: Seven
Theses, 22 SOC. TEXT 101 (2004) (arguing that critical academic projects reinforce the university as a
pillar of state power over subjugated peoples).
137. See Posner, supra note 31.
138. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 220–26 (2003).
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methods. There is no single kind of clinic that would generate deep critique and
an understanding of democratic lawyering among students. Criminal defender
clinics provide individual services and often provoke deep thinking among
students about the criminal justice system and mass incarceration.139 Clinics
focused on a geographic community or neighborhood may deploy a range of
lawyering methods, including individual case representation, to challenge
unjust conditions of life in those areas.140 A clinic focused on religious liberty
may be cast as politically conservative,141 but in fact represents poor and
working class clients and engages in the kind of multi-modal advocacy and
engagement with social movements and ideas described in Part II of this
Essay.142 It is true that the struggles of people who cannot afford to pay for
legal services are often against a bureaucratic state or exploitative private
actors. Lawyers need to be free to use all possible means to challenge the
difficult conditions of their clients’ lives. Many clinics do promote a vision of
the public good. To say that this is out of bounds within legal education is to
deny one of the foundational precepts of the legal profession.143
C. Theories of Lawyering Across Paradigms of Practice
The work described above requires adaptability, improvisation, and
invention.144 In their critique of the architecture profession in Spatial Agency,
Nishat Awan, Tatjana Schneider, and Jeremy Till resonate deeply:
Professions rely on this assertion of stable knowledge in order to give
themselves authority over others, and so to accept acting otherwise is
to recognise the limits of one’s authority, and to relinquish the sole
hold of fixed and certain knowledge. If agents are indeed to allow
themselves to act otherwise, then the knowledge that they bring to the
table must be negotiable, flexible and, above all, shared with others.145
These attributes—adaptability, improvisation, and invention—mirror the
skillset identified by the legal academic analysts of a changing private sector

139. See, e.g., M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in “Zero-Tolerance”
Policing Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351 (2012); Abbe Smith, Carrying On in
Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 CLINICAL L. REV.
723 (1995).
140. See, e.g., Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice
Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333 (2009).
141. Ethan Bronner, At Stanford, Clinical Training for Defense of Religious Liberty, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/us/at-stanford-clinical-training-for-thedefense-of-religious-liberty.html [http://perma.cc/63J8-38LM].
142. See James A. Sonne, Religious Liberty, Clinical Education, and the Art of Building
Bridges, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
143. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
144. FISCHLIN ET AL., supra note 100, at xvi.
145. NISHAT AWAN ET AL., SPATIAL AGENCY: OTHER WAYS OF DOING ARCHITECTURE 32
(2011).
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market for legal services, such as William Henderson and David Wilkins.146 In
the case of producing goods and providing services across borders, Henderson
discusses “process engineering” and the need for law graduates to understand
how to generate competent legal work product from disaggregated systems and
supply chains.147 In the case of redress for systematic elimination of indigenous
culture and community in Canada, Menkel-Meadow discusses “process
pluralism” and the need for lawyers to be able to formulate differing kinds of
dispute resolution mechanisms for variable and dynamic problems.148 In either
case, society (and future employers) demand that legal education provide law
students with ill-structured problems and give them the space and guidance to
wrestle with those problems. While ill-structured problems with high degrees
of uncertainty can be found in all sectors, local manifestations of massive and
intractable problems, such as poverty, racism, and exploitation offer a great
deal of space for law students to gain experience in process design, particularly
when they represent groups of activated community members.149 As work is
outsourced to different kinds of legal service providers, leading lawyers must
develop strategic and tactical sophistication. As work moves across borders,
leading lawyers must build relationships and collaborate effectively. These
attributes are significantly present in clinical work advanced on the tenets of
democratic lawyering.
Another favorite theme of the market-based legal education reformers is
technological change and the likely displacement of humans in providing
certain kinds of legal services. However, it is important to refrain from overdetermining outcomes of expanded technological capacity, as Frank Pasquale
and Glyn Cashwell argue: “[L]egal and cultural change can render once
contestable disputes essentially automatable, and can also render once
automatically resolved disputes open to new levels of contestation.”150 Law
schools, through scholarship and clinical practice, have an essential role to play
in helping society draw lines between automation and discretion in legal
146. See Henderson, supra note 37; David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model
of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010).
147. Henderson, supra note 37, at 486.
148. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 88, at 638:
Those who engage in the legal work affecting large groups of people with great injury will
require training and skills which may be quite different from or additional to conventional
legal training. . . . Complex, historically based, and group claims may require processes that
are more susceptible to change and modification (“contingent” solutions) than conventional
legal processes provide for. This is part of the development of the newer legal processes of
deliberative democracy and consensus building as methods of managing and handling
modern complex legal (and human) disputes that do not lend themselves so easily to final
resolutions.
149. Lawyers must also grapple with ill-structured problems and radical uncertainty in
governance. See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming
2015).
150. Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 26, 48 (2015).
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decision making. Clinics, especially, have a key role in bringing active publics
to the table as elected officials, judges, and administrators make these
decisions.
We seek above all to cultivate in students and in ourselves the capacity for
action. Difficult social problems and unjust conditions of life invite analysis
and action. These problems and conditions need a place to land within legal
education. This, in turn, makes legal education essential in society and
motivates young people to become lawyers.151
CONCLUSION
Instability creates space for experimentation and the possibility of
desubjectification or desubjugation. In David Hoy’s words, “[c]ritique does not
tell people who they really are and what they ought to do. Instead, . . . critique
challenges their understanding of who they are, and it leads them to resist their
attachment to their social identities and ideals.”152 It may not feel apparent, but
law schools possess a degree of institutional flexibility relative to
nongovernmental organizations and legal services entities. Further, legal
educators have the capacity to break down subject matter silos within our
institutions and across the university. Because of the educational mission of
law schools, there is a degree of tolerance for the inefficiency of critique and
democratic resistance, essential in this course of experimentation.
Institutionally, law schools have the potential to flourish by resisting extractive,
neoliberal approaches and centering social problems as the core content of
learning agendas and active publics as collaborative partners. Through this
cogenerative work with those at the margins, we can gain the capacity to
envision new forms of legal practice, grounded in the profession’s justiceseeking, public-good-advancing norms and values.

151. At a recent conference, Professor Catherine Smith of Denver University Sturm College of
Law reported on a talk she gave to high school students as part of the school’s pipeline efforts. Student
enthusiasm for law school grew when she discussed the complicated legal and political challenges that
Ferguson and the Movement for Black Lives presented. When the students began to talk about why
they would attend law school in the current social context, they grew more animated and passionate
about the possibility. Catherine Smith, Univ. of Denver Coll. of Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the Law and Society Association (May 29, 2015); see Catherine Smith, Seven Principles:
Increasing Access to Law School Among Students of Color, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1677 (2011).
152. HOY, supra note 79, at 14.
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